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Abstract
Introduction The Major Incident Hospital (MIH) is a
unique facility strictly reserved to provide immediate large-
scale emergency care for victims of disasters and major
incidents. We evaluated the implemented organization to
identify strengths and weaknesses, and provide knowledge
essential for further improvement of preparedness.
Method According to the Protocol for Reports from
Major accidents and Disasters (PRMD) and along with our
ﬁve scenarios for activation, we analyzed all the data from
evaluation reports of all our deployments since the MIH
was founded in 1991.
Results The MIH was able to provide group-wise emer-
gency care to military (29 admissions) as well as civilian
victims of major incidents and disasters, both national
(260) and international (226). Group-wise treatment was
advantageous for quarantine, logistics, registration, emo-
tional support and (pre)arrangements for family, media and
security. Strong points are preparedness and availability of
a dedicated facility, including ICU, X-ray and OR facili-
ties, irrespective of MRSA status and prearranged coop-
eration, e.g., with a trauma centre, poison centre and the
military. Evaluation, research and training resulted in a
barcode registration system and continuous adaptations to
improve preparedness. Shortage of resources did not occur;
use of the MIH’s available resources for national incidents
though, could be further optimized.
Conclusions Recommendations for the future are:
improvement of imbedding in regional and national pro-
cedures, continued dedicated time and staff for training,
research and development, improvement of nuclear/biolo-
gical/chemical decontamination facilities and prepared-
ness, implementation of standardized scoring systems and
expansion of registration systems to the prehospital setting.
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Abbreviations
CMH Central Military Hospital
EAN European Article Numbering
ICU Intensive Care Unit
MIH Major Incident Hospital
MRSA Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
NVIC National Poison Information Centre
PBRS Patient Barcode Registration System
PRMD Protocol for Reports from Major Accidents and
Disasters
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, caused by
the SARS coronavirus
UMCU University Medical Centre Utrecht
Introduction
A disaster or major incident causes a sudden, unexpected
surge of casualties. In general, disasters produce physical
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DOI 10.1007/s00068-010-0067-0injury. Medical management does not simply involve
treating these like in regular trauma care in upscaled pro-
portions, but requires a paradigm change in concepts,
approaches and mindset [1]. Preparation and training is
essential to cope with the challenge of providing optimal
care and to minimize excess morbidity and mortality [1, 2].
Since 1991, the Netherlands has had a Major Incident
Hospital (MIH) to provide immediate medical emergency
care for multiple casualties under exceptional circum-
stances. This unique facility is strictly reserved, with
expertise and complete infrastructure waiting to provide
large scale emergency care with disasters and major inci-
dents [3].
Its missions are divided into ﬁve scenarios indicating
deployment:
1. War (threat), crisis or conﬂict management in which
large numbers of casualties need care
2. Accidents abroad involving Dutch citizens, civilian or
military, in need of repatriation and medical care
3. Speciﬁc incidents, attacks or large-scale accidents in
the Netherlands that exceed the regular care capacity
4. International medical assistance from the Dutch gov-
ernment concerning the treatment of foreign victims
5. Quarantine care for patients with special infectious and
highly contagious diseases, such as SARS (Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome).
The opening of the MIH is an essential part of the
disaster plan of the University Medical Centre Utrecht
(UMCU) and the Central Military Hospital (CMH). The
MIH is located in a nuclear bunker under the UMCU,
which is in turn connected to the CMH by a corridor. An
Emergency Response Protocol enables admittance to the
normally dormant hospital of up to 100 patients after a
start-up time of only 15 min. With an additional 45 min the
patient count can be extended to 300. Personnel are alerted
through a personnel alert system. The organization, infra-
structure and training are all directed around triage to guide
patient ﬂow through successive echelons of care in order to
deliver the greatest care to the greatest number of people
(Figs. 1, 2). The Patient Barcode Registration System
(PBRS) with European Article Numbering (EAN) codes
guarantees quick and adequate registration to facilitate
good medical coordination and follow-up during a major
incident [4].
As analysis of the implemented organization and clinical
management could identify helpful decisions and errors, we
evaluated the use of the MIH and its admissions during the
past 19 years. Research and evaluation of past incidents
provide knowledge for preparedness and response to
unknown future incidents and are essential for further
improvements [5]. Systematically evaluating the quality of
medical response to major incidents is difﬁcult, though,
especially because of obvious differences in the types
of disasters and a wide variety in modes of evaluation.
Furthermore, there is no standardization of reporting yet.
Performance indicators for the quality of the medical
response are scarce but have been evolving in the past
decade. Critical mortality rate (the percentage of severely
wounded victims who die), for example, gives an indication
of the magnitude of the disaster and of the effectiveness of
the medical management [5, 6]. To evaluate the perfor-
mance of the MIH, however, this tool would be too general
and more reﬂective of the performance of the total of
disaster response than of hospital care alone. Ruter et al. [7]
suggest a set of 20 performance indicators that they applied
to 13 earlier reports on major incidents issued by the
KAMEDO organization in Sweden. These consist mainly of
timeframes for decisions and actions at the scene and at the
level of command and control, predominantly prehospital.
They also developed some performance indicators for
testing the skills of hospital management groups in simu-
lation exercises [8]. Some indicators of preparedness, not
Fig. 1 Map of the MIH
Fig. 2 Entrance of the ambulance hall of the MIH
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preparedness [9]. The Utstein template [10] also suggests a
method for a more scientiﬁc approach. For this goal, it
seems too elaborate and theoretical. Lennquist suggested a
template to report major incidents, the Protocol for Reports
from Majoraccidents and Disasters (PRMD) [11]. Itoffers a
standardized methodology for reporting results and expe-
riences from major accidents and disasters to improve
comparability. It facilitates exchange of experiences and
promotes international collaboration in methodological
development. The protocol is divided in 18 headings con-
cerning components of the incident as well as of the
response, complemented with standardized tables.
Although originally developed to evaluate and report about
individual major incidents, it offers us a concise and prac-
tical template to direct the evaluation of the MIH deploy-
ment, as well as a standardized method for reporting.
Objective
In this study, we evaluate the use of the MIH since its
founding in 1991, according to the PRMD [11] and along
with our ﬁve scenarios for activation. Further central
questions were: how did we perform in the ﬁve openings
scenarios? What are the strong points in group treatment?
Which changes led to identiﬁable and sustainable
improvements? Was the MIH effectively used in the whole
chain of disaster management? What are our recommen-
dations for the future?
Materials and methods
Our evaluation concerns the performance of the MIH itself.
Inclusion of the prehospital evaluation for 34 incidents is
beyond the scope of this analysis.
We retrieved all data from the evaluation reports of
every MIH deployment since its founding in 1991. Reports
had been made directly after the event as part of the
debrieﬁng in almost every admission, and had been dis-
cussed among involved disciplines for learning points and
accuracy. One of the authors (JvdE) participated in all
admissions and evaluations until 2008 except the repatri-
ation of fugitives from Kosovo (1999). Missing data were
retrieved retrospectively from the charts and medical ﬁles.
These ﬁles had all been kept on paper within the MIH.
Demographic and quantitative data were registered
(such as number of patients, types of injuries, hospital
resources). All applicable data were registered according
to the PMRD protocol [11], which is divided into 18 head-
ings that we used to direct our evaluation (see Table 1).
The standardized tables from the protocol were used,
sometimes extended with additional columns. For qualita-
tive, descriptive values we abstracted the results of all
admissions and further discussed admissions which
revealed the most interesting learning points.
Results
The subheadings in this paragraph are analogous to the 18
subheadings of the PRMD.
1/2/3 Summary of the scenario/hazard, description of
accident
All 34 consecutive deployments of the MIH are
depicted in Table 2, summarized with short
descriptions of each event and the type of activa-
tion scenario. Military victims (29) accounted for
5% of the admitted patients and 18% of the
deployments. Two hundred and twenty-six (38%)
Dutch victims of major incidents abroad were
repatriated in 12 group admissions, whereas
national incidents accounted for 260 patients
(47%) and 35% of the deployments of the MIH.
The rest consist of 4 openings to offer care for
foreign incident disaster victims (44 patients,
10%). Special infectious disease admissions did
not take place. For national incidents the distances
from the scene to the MIH (0.3–60 km) are also
depicted in Table 2. For international deployment,
Table 1 Headings from protocol for reports from major accidents
and disasters [10]
Headings
1 Short summary of the scenario*
2 Description of hazard(s) causing the accident*
3 Description of the accident*
4 Prehospital resources available and alerted
5 Hospital resources available and alerted*
6 Utilization of transport resources
7 Hospital alert plan and response*
8 Coordination and command*
9 Hospital damage*
10 Communication system*
11 Computer Technology and back-up systems*
12 Total number and type of injuries*
13 Severity of injuries*
14 Hospital load*
15 Psychological reactions*
16 Outcome
17 Estimated number of people affected but not injured
18 Post-accident evaluation*
* Data available for analysis
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varying from several hundred to thousands of
kilometers.
4. Evaluation of ‘‘Prehospital resources available
and alerted’’ lies beyond the scope of this report
5. Hospital resources available or alerted
As the MIH is a reserved facility for major incidents,
availability of triage rooms (35 beds), low and
medium care beds (200), ICU beds (12), ventilators,
radiology unit, operating theaters and trauma unit is
Table 2 Overview of use of the MIH: year, number of admitted patients, short description of the incident, distance (km) from the scene, cohort
quarantine and main type of scenario for deployment of the MIH (see below)
Year Number
of
patients
Incident characteristics (location of incident) Distance, or
country if
abroad
Quarantine Main
scenario*
1991 9 Methyl bromide intoxication (used by gardeners decontaminating greenhouses) 45 km No 3
1991 9 Carbon monoxide intoxication; insufﬁcient boiler in non ventilated space (Utrecht) 5–10 km No 3
1992 10 Carbon monoxide intoxication of ﬁreman on duty 5–10 km No 3
1992 5 Exposure to nitrous damps (…) 5–10 km No 3
1992 28 Evacuation of a hospital in a war setting (Bosnia Herzegovina) Bosnia Yes 4
1992 13 Plane crash (Faro) with a ﬁre Portugal Yes 2
1993 43 Bus accident (Lyon) France Yes 2
1993 5 Evacuation of a hospital in a war setting (Bosnia Herzegovina) Bosnia Yes 4
1994 4 Bus accident (Regensburg, Germany) Germany Yes 2
1995 143 Evacuation of a ﬂooded Hospital 52 km No 3
1995 7 Benzyl bromide exposure (Utrecht) 5–10 km No 3
1996 29 Bus accident of Dutch singing choir (Winterberg) Germany Yes 2
1996 12 Cannabis intoxication (Zeist) 8 km No 3
1996 6 Aluminium pollution of ﬂuids in dialysis centre Curacao No 4
1996 11 Bus accident (Antalya) Turkey Yes 2
1996 15 Carbon monoxide intoxication by inadequate boiler in insufﬁciently ventilated building 5–10 km No 3
1996 10 Bus accident of tourist bus from Netherlands (Thionville) France Yes 2
1997 7 Military accident (Novi Travnik, Bosnia Herzegovina) Bosnia Yes 1
1997 13 Bus accident Syria Yes 2
1998 20 Bus accident of tourist bus from the Netherlands (Metz) France Yes 2
1999 5 Repatriation of fugitives Kososvo Yes 4
1999 12 Earthquake, Turkish, Dutch residents on holiday Turkey Yes 2
2000 9 Military accident Germany No 1
2002 25 Bus accident of tourist bus from Netherlands (Metz, France) France Yes 2
2002 21 Bus accident of tourist bus from Netherlands (Manching, Germany) Germany Yes 2
2003 13 Lab accident, analysis of glue-damp with eye and airway irritation (methyl metacrylate) 0.3 km No 3
2005 25 Repatriation of wounded Dutch tsunami victims Asia Yes 2
2007 6 Collapse of crane on a campus building 0.4 km No 3
2007 4 Repatriation of soldiers from Afghanistan (victims of a suicide bombing while on patrol) Afghanistan Yes 1
2008 25 Evacuation (350 emloyees) from a contaminated building in Amersfoort (unknown
substance)
23 km No 3
2009 6 Airplane crash near Schiphol airport (‘‘Polder Crash’’) with 135 passengers 60 km No 3
2009 4 Repatriation of military victims Afghanistan Afghanistan Yes 1
2009 2 Repatriation of military victims Afghanistan Afghanistan Yes 1
2009 3 Repatriation of military victims Afghanistan Afghanistan Yes 1
Total 559
* Scenario’s for activation of the MIH: (1) Military victims, (2) repatriation of Dutch victims of accidents or incidents abroad, cohort-isolation
for Methicilline Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) according to guidelines of the Netherlands Health Care Inspectorate, (3) activation of
the MIH for a national Major Incident or disaster, (4) international medical assistance from the Dutch government concerning the treatment of
foreign victims, (5) quarantine care for patients with special infectious and highly contagious diseases, e.g. SARS
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staff them. In all evaluated deployments, stafﬁng has
never proved to be a problem; the capacity could
always be operational for the ﬁrst 100 beds within
15 min to half an hour. Training issues of deployed
staff are discussed below (Figs. 3, 4, 5, 6).
In the evaluation of optimal use of resources,
situations in which the MIH was available but not
deployed are particularly interesting.
An example is the Volendam cafe ´ ﬁre on New Year’s
Eve, 2001, where 98 victims were transported to 20
hospitals and 100 victims went to different ERs of
hospitals on their own. Four people died. The MIH
was alerted 7 h after the incident with the request to
receive two burn patients that could be regularly
admitted to the UMCU. In total 11 patients were
admitted to the UMCU. Numerous patients were
transferred to a widespread variety of hospitals and it
took a full day afterwards to get an overview. A bus
with 20 T3 victims (in the four scale triage system
[12]) was sent to a hospital that turned out to have no
capacity left and had to divert to another hospital
[13]. The MIH could have better contributed to care
and simplifying patient logistics had it been deployed
in an earlier stage.
The collapse of stairs during a musical parade in 2008
[14] is an example where 19 patients were seen in one
trauma centre and the MIH was not deployed. Medical
management went well and was within surge capacity
of the hospital. In this case, using the trauma centre or
MIH were both good options and the choice was a
matter of preference of the staff on call. Using the MIH
for ﬁrst relief would have eased logistics and commu-
nication with supporting facilities that were now
problematic due to provisional patient numbering [14].
After the plane crash near Schiphol (‘‘Polder Crash’’
2009), 42 of the 135 victims patients were transported
from the triage site by bus to a sports complex after
beingtriagedasT3.Thetwotriagedoctors atthesports
Fig. 3 Low care unit in dormant times
Fig. 4 Low care unit in use
Fig. 5 Triage and treatment area, red bay (photo B de Meijer)
Fig. 6 Triage and treatment area-red bay, stabilisation of a patient
(photo B de Meijer)
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due to high energy characteristics of the crash and
triage levels higher than T3. They were spread to
several hospitals and it took 4 days to reconstruct the
victim list and whereabouts of the patients [15]. Only
six patients were transported to the MIH.
One of the other specialties of the MIH is relief of
groups of patients in quarantine, which otherwise often
generates logistic problems and delay of repatriation to
regular hospitals.
In 1994, a group of Dutch victims from a bus accident
in Poland were repatriated to a city hospital instead of
to the MIH due to political choices of the hometown
government, despite prior alert and readiness of the
MIH. This resultedina forcedtemporary closure ofthe
regular surgery and orthopedic departments due to
MRSA contamination.
In the Faro plane crash in 1992, 95 patients were
repatriatedto6hospitalsincludingtheMIH.Eight(8%)
proved to be infected with MRSA. This corresponds
with 14% of the MRSA category II patients (patients
with minimum 24 h stay or invasive procedures in a
foreign hospital). This led to secondary spread to other
patients and staff in one of the Burn Centers.
Repatriation in quarantine from Thailand to the MIH
after the 2004 tsunami showed several carriers of
MRSA and other multi-resistant microorganisms [16].
Repatriations of military victims from Kosovo and
Afghanistan to our facility also showed multiple
victims with MRSA and Acinetobacter colonization.
Of all the quarantine admissions, 61% or more of the
patients could be discharged home within the 5 days
thataresetasadirectivetoclosetheMIH,orquarantine
could be ended due to negative swabs. Transfers under
quarantine conditions were reduced to 32% of the
patients who were initially treated in quarantine.
During the SARS threat we adapted our facilities and
training to prepare for patients with special highly
infectious diseases. Since 2003, the MIH has changed
the air treatment and can provide 4 isolation boxes and
30 medium care beds for this type of scenario.
6. Utilization of transport resources was not applicable/
evaluated.
7. Hospital alert plan and response
Opening of the MIH is always based on activation of
the local disaster plan. When the Emergency
Response Program is started, the medical manager
of the Emergency Room activates the personnel alert
system through the national civilian telephone net-
work. This system has specially reserved capacity for
use by the disaster management chain. During all
deployments, communication through this system
was never hindered by the inundation of the regular
mobile network, as often occurs in disaster situations.
In contrast to a normal, time consuming ‘‘calling
tree’’, results are monitored and adjustable once
running, as personnel respond to the system if and
when they are available. This system enabled us to
tailor the alert. At ﬁrst, we worked with different lists
adapted to several scenarios but these incurred too
much overlap. In the current system, we can compose
the alerted staff by choosing and combining groups,
e.g., ‘‘base’’, ‘‘surgery’’, ‘‘anesthesia’’ etc. The system
is tested every 6 months for effectivity and to keep
numbers updated. Alerts resulted in an average direct
availability of 50%, with slightly lower rates at night.
Under-alert has not occurred, except for two cases
were the radiology department was not included in the
initial call. Over-alert was the case in the Polder Crash
(2009). Within 45 min after the crash we contacted
the regional command center dealing with the crash to
inform them that we were available to receive patients
within half an hour. This was after seeing the
information on the Internet and after the UMCU had
been alarmed by the regional ambulance service. In
fact, the MIH was never formally approached or
informed by the central coordination centre nor by the
national crisis team. The MIH was opened based on
controversial information from the scene and a second
alert from the regional ambulance service that the ﬁrst
four patients were already on their way to our centre.
One hundred forty-three staff members were alerted,
of which 39 were deployed and the rest were sent
home. Finally, only six patients (four T2 and two T3)
were transferred to our hospital [15].
8. Organization of coordination and command
Evaluation of preparedness and function scores of all
prehospital units of the response chain lies beyond
the scope of this report.
FortheMIH,thetraumasurgeononcallisfullylicensed
to open the MIH, which beneﬁtted opening speed.
Hereafter, a dual command system is implemented.
This means that the Command Team focuses on
organization of the relief and treatment of the victims
in the Major Incident Hospital itself, and a separate
ManagementTeamisresponsibleforexternallogistics,
continuity of the care in the CMH and UMC, internal
and external communication and the organization of
ﬁrst relief of family/relatives. This proved to keep the
Command Team alert and in control and prevented
distraction by external business beyond patient relief.
9. Hospital damage due to a disaster was never the
case. Admission of 13 patients with an inhalation
problem from the UMCU laboratory and the collapse
of the crane on the same university campus were the
nearest scenarios.
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In the beginning, team leaders carried portable
phones. This proved distracting as it generated a lot
of (unnecessary) use and people did not always
know how to use them effectively, not being
accustomed to them in the daily setting. We
abandoned them (apart from ambulance hall) and
chose regular pagers. This resulted in strict reserved
use and effectivity. After 1992 the PBRS provided
continuous and updated group and patient data in
every area and at every working station in the MIH.
This resulted in clear improvement in medical,
nursing and logistic handling and covered many of
the communication needs. It enabled staff to better
anticipate and manage care requirements and
effectively use resources and personnel up to
discharge [17]. Short ‘‘chief meetings’’ took place
at regular intervals. During these meetings, the
operational unit supervisors discuss all crucial steps
with the command team and make logistic decisions
and other arrangements between all participating
units, ranging from security to operation rooms. The
supervisors return to their units to implement the
decisions. This proved very effective in sharing
information and plans quickly and greatly simpliﬁed
procedures to get things done and manage the entire
organisation.
11. Computer technology and back-up systems
We did not encounter major computer system
failures during admissions. Regular exercises in
the MIH helped us to improve ease of use. A backup
system is present but has never been used. The
PBRS that we developed showed 25% fewer
inaccuracies when compared with the handwritten
medical charts, despite the greater number of items
entered [17]. Extensive training proved to be
unnecessary. (Para-) medical personnel judged the
automated procedures an improvement. The cou-
pling with the Hospital Information system worked
well. The follow up chart of patient care in the MIH
is not computerized, yet; that is a goal for the future.
12. Total number and type of injuries
Total number and type of injuries are depicted in
Table 3. Almost half of the patients (254, 45%) were
admitted with injuries due to mechanical violence.
Inhalation accounts for 16% (93) of the admitted
patients.
13. Severity of injuries
All patients were triaged on admission. Except for
triage on admission, we did not use a standard
scoring system as for example, the Injury Severity
Score (ISS). Severity of injuries according to
treatment is depicted in Table 4 and was relatively
low (as well as retrospectively estimated ISS above
15). Most patients ([95%) were triaged at priority 2
or 3. Intensive care use (4/559 = 0.7%) and venti-
lator dependency were scarce (4/559 = 0.7%), as
was need of immediate surgery (deﬁned as within
1 h) (0%).
14. Hospital load
Congestion, lack of material, resources or personnel
inﬂuencing optimal patient care did not occur in any
of the deployments. Volunteers from the Red Cross to
assist in patient care and transport within the MIH
proved to be a valuable addition to the professional
pool (Fig. 7). Discharge and transfer procedures were
delayed and sometimes congested because often
many patients were discharged at the same time and
deﬁnite discharge papers had to be prepared, which
requires staff time. Therefore, in 1999, we developed
an automated patient discharge letter system and
appointed one person in medical staff to supervise
this. This improved the discharge process, resulting in
no more delays.
15. Psychological reactions and management
In every admission, staff members from the psychol-
ogy and psychiatric department are available to
provide psychological support for victims, relatives
and staff. They are supported by volunteers from the
Red Cross who assist patients in personal care and
Table 3 Total number and type of injuries
Type Number of injured
Mechanical violence 254
Military (29)
Non-military (225)
Fire 13
Inhalation 93
Methyl bromide (9)
Carbon monoxide (34)
Nitrous damps (5)
Other (45)
Corrosive agents 0
Irradiation 0
Cold 0
Drowning 0
Biological contamination 0
Other 199
Mixed hospital population, external evacuation causes
(war, ﬂooding) (181)
Cannabis intoxication (12)
Aluminium intoxication (6)
Total 559
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referral advice for support after discharge. Patients
rate this as very positive in patient evaluations. Being
among peers was perceived to be supportive and
contributing to resilience. Long term evaluation
among the repatriated tsunami victims showed that
need for professional support often arises at a later
stage than directly after the disaster, sometimes even
after months or years [18]. We are currently explor-
ing how we can address this by offering a gateway to
professional help through a site that can be accessed
at any time after the disaster. In analogy with the site
launched after the tsunami (http://www.tisei.org) [19]
this site combines self help through mutual victim
contact and self-assessment with eConsult possibili-
ties.
Post-deployment evaluations with personnel showed
that they experienced substantially more emotional
burden when caring for incident victims than in
regular hospital care. This was not determined by
severity of wounds or physical trauma but mostly by
the impressive stories, emotional reunion of victims
with families and (media) attention that comes with
major incidents. During victim relief and during shift
changes, a consultative psychiatric nurse is present
for personnel. An aftercare team contacts them
afterwards. Informal gatherings after the admission
proved to give more room for sharing emotions and
feelings than meetings labeled to address emotional
impact.
16. Outcome with regard to mortality and persistent
disability
In-hospital mortality was low (1/559 = 0.2%). This
concerns a patient that was repatriated from a military
mission to conﬁrm brain death and to stop treatment
amidst his family. Persistent disability was not scored
andwasdifﬁculttoquantify,astheMIHisashort-term
facility that closes after a few days. Opening time
ranged between 1 and 5 days. Clinical patients were
then transferred to other hospitals and follow-up of
outpatientswasdonemainlyinthehomecityhospitals.
From the 559 patients, 256 patients (46%) were
transferred to other hospitals, while 303 (54%) could
be discharged home within closing time of the MIH.
17. Estimated number of people affected, not injured was
not scored.
18. Post-accident evaluation
Post accident evaluation of preparedness
The disaster plan is the basis for the MIH and was
always activated in the case of admissions. The
evaluations showed that the basic disaster plan
functioned well. Some of the adaptations are
described in the above paragraphs. Another important
ﬁnding in the evaluations concerns preparedness for
situations that require decontamination. During the
evacuation from a building contaminated with an
initially unknown gas in 2008, patients entered the
MIH without decontamination. Afterwards, decon-
tamination proved unnecessary as it turned out to
be smoke from an aircon ﬁre, but this reinforced
Table 4 Severity of injuries according to treatment
Type Number
Repatriation National
incident
Total
Less severe injuries not examined or
treated by medical professionals
a
n.a.
Less to moderately severe injuries
examined and/or treated by medical
professionals
a
Outside hospital n.a.
In hospital 2 13 15
Injuries requiring in-hospital care/
observation in
297 247 544
Regular ward 289 175 464
Medium care 4 72 76
Intensive care 4 0 4
Requiring ventilator 4 0 4
Injuries requiring surgery (general
anaesthesia)
31* 0* 31*
Immediately 0 0 0
Within 6 h 7 0 7
Delayed 24* 0* 24*
n.a. not applicable
* In four admissions several additional delayed surgery procedures in
referral clinic
a Medical professionals deﬁned as ambulance staff, paramedics,
nurses and doctors
Fig. 7 Patient transport by volunteers of the Red Cross (photo B de
Meijer)
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how to start decontamination procedures. In a train-
ing session for decontamination within the MIH, we
also concluded that our ability to decontaminate large
groups of patients was insufﬁcient. We further
extended training and are currently improving the
infrastructure and decontamination facilities (Fig. 8).
Post accident evaluation of training In the ﬁrst years,
optimal relief was sometimes hindered by the fact
that the majority of the alarmed personnel was still
relatively unfamiliar with procedures and logistics in
the MIH. This mandated the expansion of training
activities and starting up a pool of personnel who
spend part of their time performing tasks in regular
care when the MIH is dormant, but spend the rest of
their time outside deployment times on training and
preparedness. They now form the basis for training
the rest of the pool of dedicated doctors, nurses and
support team from all UMCU/CMH departments that
can be alerted. Regular theoretical classes, case
exercises and disaster simulations within the MIH
or together with the whole chain resulted in smoother
cooperation and better preparedness (Fig. 9). In an
environment where teams are always assembled from
a big pool, and of which a considerable portion is
made up of residents that change every 2 years, the
intensity of training with a strong base proved crucial.
Discussion
The goal of availability, preparedness and quick perfor-
mance was met in four of the ﬁve deployment criteria of
the MIH. A major incident with contagious diseases or
material (ﬁfth criterion, added since 2003) has not yet
occurred.
In the relief and repatriation of military victims (ﬁrst
scenario) the MIH has proved its surplus value in avail-
ability of the total range of care (low care till ICU and OR
as well as radiology facilities) without quarantine restric-
tions and disturbance of regular care. This facilitates quick
repatriation and initiation of treatment, which is often not
possible in war/mission setting. MIH staff is partly military
and is familiar with repatriation procedures and concurrent
emotional impact for patients and family. The same
advantages account for civil repatriations (second scenario)
in quarantine after incidents and disasters abroad. The
Netherlands follows a strict quarantine policy for all for-
eign patients in order to rule out potential infection with
MRSA and other multi-resistant bacteria to prevent trans-
mission to other patients or healthcare workers. This policy
is reinforced by recent literature that shows that MRSA
types have a predominantly regional distribution in Europe
[20]. This ﬁnding is indicative of the selection and spread
of a limited number of clones within health care networks,
suggesting that control efforts aimed at interrupting the
spread within and between health care institutions may not
only be feasible but ultimately successful and, therefore,
desirable [20]. In this evaluation, (MRSA) quarantine has
again proved necessary in several deployments and non-
deployments. Some examples are discussed above. Group-
wise relief in quarantine has the advantage of availability,
risk reduction for regular care and reduction of further
quarantine efforts. In the quarantine admissions, the
majority of the patients could be discharged home before
closure of MIH, or quarantine could be ended due to
negative swabs. Transfers under quarantine conditions
could be greatly reduced and have the advantage of prep-
aration time for the receiving hospital. Preparation time is
not only favorable for quarantine issues but time also
permitted selection of the most suitable follow-up hospital
Fig. 8 Training with decontamination in a multidisciplinary excer-
cise with 100 victims, MIH 2010
Fig. 9 Cooperation between military and civil services (Ambulance
hall MIH)
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geography. Since the repatriation from the bus accident in
Poland (1994), the Dutch policy is to perform all group
wise repatriations in quarantine in the MIH.
For the third opening scenario, national major incidents,
the deployment of the MIH was relatively low and its
availability and capacity were certainly not used to maxi-
mum advantage. Distance to the scene might be a reason
for using other facilities, but in many cases this was not an
issue. Utrecht and the MIH are located quite centrally in
the Netherlands. For example, in the Polder Crash the MIH
was well within 60 km of the accident, comparable to
distances to some of the other deployed hospitals. Direct
availability for the entire group would have eased logistics.
We believe the most important factor is suboptimal
embedding of the MIH in the Dutch system of incident
relief. The organization of disaster relief in the Netherlands
is strongly developing and new liaisons with the MIH are
still in progress. The fact that the MIH is not used in reg-
ular trauma care might also contribute to suboptimal use of
its capacity. The regional medical ofﬁcer in charge of an
incident, as well as the regional command center, might not
always be familiar with the advantages the MIH has to
offer. The National Coordination centre was not always
deployed, although it is appointed for interregional activi-
ties and major incidents. Furthermore, hospitals in the
affected region, and especially trauma centers, are eager to
care for ‘‘their own’’ patients and do what they trained for
in trauma care and in their hospital disaster plans. Perfor-
mance of the regular Dutch trauma centers and hospitals
proved to be good for multiple trauma/incident patients in
terms of direct care within surge capacity [14, 15, 21].
Leap-frogging could guard these capacities in not-too-
extensive incidents, but it also complicates communication,
patient overview, logistics, impact on regular care (over-
and under-alert of several hospitals), family support, media
and security [13, 15, 21]. The MIH could make a valuable
contribution in effective use of all available capacity and
delivering the best care to the greatest number of patients.
This does not necessarily mean that all patients should
always go to the MIH. A good distribution could be to
transport T1 victims to trauma centers and group T2 and T3
victims to the MIH. This allows trauma centers and local
hospitals to focus on T1 victims and unavoidable self-
referrals. Meanwhile the MIH can sort out the bulk,
eventually with some of the T1 victims, in a situation that
is designed for further triage through successive echelons
of care, and where other conditions for good group wise
treatment are prearranged, such as reserved availability of
resources (100–300 beds; 12 ICU, 38 medium care and 50
low care, OR, radiology, etc.), registration, psychological
support, media, family issues and security. This could
facilitate prehospital organization and quicker patient
overview [15]. In contrast to the situation after the Polder
Crash, for example, where completing the victim list took
4 days, institutions have only to contact one hospital with
regard to numbers of patients, severity of injury and per-
sonal data. The PBRS directly provides a real time over-
view. Relief for T1 victims is also possible in the MIH, but
this patient group beneﬁts most from fast treatment, justi-
fying transportation to the nearest adequate facility. Fur-
thermore, they generally have a longer and more intense
treatment path that merits signiﬁcant and highly qualiﬁed
personnel and resources. Spreading of these patients among
trauma centers can probably guarantee better continuity of
care after ﬁrst relief. For these patients the additional value
of being among fellow survivors is less relevant.
Irrespective of the type of scenario, group-wise treat-
ment had several advantages, including mutual support
among patients and (pre)arrangements for logistics, regis-
tration, family and media.
Looking at the other points we evaluated, communica-
tion and computer technologies deserve further develop-
ment. Although the PBRS functions well and brings unique
advantages for real time overview and management,
extension of patient registration and tracking to the pre-
hospital setting would be desirable. For this goal we
developed a Victim Tracking and Tracing System (ViTTS),
that will be discussed in another paper. Digitalization of the
entire medical chart within the MIH would maximize yield
of the PBRS, the discharge letter system and would facil-
itate research.
Furthermore, we aim to implement the ISS [22] for reg-
istration of injury severity. This is an internationally used
scoringsystem,usefulforcategorizingseverityaswellasfor
reporting. This would allow easier comparisons, also with
regulartraumacareandwithoutcomerelatedtoISS.Among
our admitted patients were relatively few T1 patients or
patientswithretrospectivelyestimatedinjuryseverityscores
above 15. This observation has three explanations: In some
incidents severely injured patients went to other hospitals
(e.g.,PolderCrash2009),insomecases(e.g.,cranecollapse,
busaccident andevacuationofﬂoodedhospital)theincident
itself produced mainly T2 or T3 victims, as in most
mechanical disasters [23] and ﬁnally because some admis-
sionswererepatriationswithaselectedgroupthatwasstable
enough to travel (e.g., tsunami repatriation).
Conclusions
The MIH has demonstrated its ability to provide group-wise
emergency care to military as well as civil victims of major
incidents and disasters, national or from abroad, in all sce-
nariosforactivationexceptcareforspecialhighlyinfectious
diseases (as this did not occur). Group-wise treatment
28 G. M. H. Marres et al.proved to be advantageous for quarantine, logistics, regis-
tration,emotionalsupportand(pre)arrangementsforfamily,
media and security. Preparedness and availability, irre-
spective of MRSA status, including ICU, X-ray and OR
facilities and prearranged cooperation, e.g., with the
UMCU, NVIC and the military, are strong points. Evalua-
tion and training resulted in developments such as the PBRS
and continuous adaptations to improve preparedness.
Key recommendations for further development are:
– Better imbedding in regional and national procedures to
optimize use of availability in case of national disas-
ters; expand involvement of other trauma centers.
– Continued training, research and development, preser-
vation of a pool of dedicated staff to keep the
organization alive and moving.
– Improvement of nuclear/biological/chemical decontam-
ination facilities, adaptation to external developments.
– Expansion of the PBRS within the MIH and in the
prehospital phase: create fully electronic patient charts
and prehospital patient tracking and tracing.
– Implementation of standardized scoring systems to
record injury type and severity to facilitate research and
comparability.
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